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E

ighteenth-century American politics does more

scholars take a bifurcated view of what is called the
federal/national question. This question concerns
where sovereignty is located in the American political
system. On one side, federalists maintain that
sovereignty resides with the states (Van Tyne 1907;
Berger 1987; Bennett 1942). For federalists, America
is properly thought of in terms of citizens of sovereign

than simply provide us with the U.S. Constitution.

states, independent of each other, who are linked

According to Gordon Wood (1991, 32), the stakes

together only by common interest.
In opposition, nationalists maintain that the

of eighteenth-century historical arguments are very
high, as they deal with “nothing less than the kind
of society we have been, or ought to become.”
Barry Shain (1994, xiv) concurs with Wood, arguing
that an understanding of the American founding
“defines how Americans understand themselves
as a historical people, as well as constraining what
they might become.” As Wood and Shain indicate,
an understanding of eighteenth-century American
political thought shapes how we understand our past
and informs the decisions we make about our future.
Despite the consensus on the importance

U.S. Constitution is grounded on a commitment to
popular sovereignty. In other words, that sovereignty
is located in the hands of the American people (Wood
1977; Breen 1997; Ferguson 2000). Where nationalists
disagree with one another is on the question of
where America’s commitment to national, popular
sovereignty comes from. Answers to this question
include the following: 1) nationalism’s origins can
be traced to our colonial experience (Wood 1998;
Rossiter 1966), 2) nationalism developed between
1776 and 1787 (Green 1986), 3) national sovereignty

of our eighteenth-century political thinking,

is a completion of the principles of the American

scholars continue to debate how these political

Revolution (Diamond 1992), and 4) a consequence

principles should be understood. When considering

of decisions made by the particular delegates to the

the question of how we should understand the

Constitutional Convention (Wolfe 1977; Onuf 1988;

government created by the U.S. Constitution,

Jensen 1943; Roche 1961).
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A third, hybrid approach attempts to reconcile

Mogg demonstrates that the theory of sovereignty

the bifurcated positions on the federal/national

found at the Convention employs a conceptual

question. Here, scholars contend that the ideological

distinction between principle and derived sovereignty.

struggle between federalists and nationalists is

The first concept deals with the authority from which

between delegates from small and large states

power is derived and Mogg (2006, 3) refers to this

(Diamond 1992; Powell 1987; McDonald 1985). In

as principle sovereignty. The second concept deals

making this argument, these scholars concur with

with the exercise of power and is referred to as

James Madison in Federalist #39 that the Constitution

derived sovereignty (Mogg 2006, 3). The fact that

is partly federal and partly national (#39: 199). In

delegates to the Convention employ two competing

this understanding, delegates vest the people with the

operationalizations of principle sovereignty explains,

power of the ultimate principle sovereign but does not

according to Mogg, why scholars have not been able

always give them a direct say in government.
Despite their differences, all three bodies of

to resolve the federal/national tension.
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of Mogg’s

scholarship share a common assumption: that the U.S.

argument, it would be premature to conclude that the

Constitution is informed by a coherent understanding

theory she identifies animates the American political

of sovereignty. Mogg (2006) analyzes Madison’s,

system. This is the case for two reasons. First, her

Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention,

analysis focuses exclusively on Madison’s Notes.

and tests the assumption that there is a single,

Bilder (2015, 3) concludes that the Notes constitute

coherent understanding of sovereignty that informs

“one man’s view of the writing of a constitution...”

the arguments and decisions of the delegates to the

and not an adequate account of the Constitution’s

Convention. Employing a methodological approach

meaning. More importantly, Bilder argues that

where she constructs the political positions of each

Madison only returned to the Notes in response to the

delegate over the course of the entire Convention,

specific challenges faced by the new government and

Mogg finds that the Constitution is informed by a

the political ideas of Thomas Jefferson. Thus, not only

single, multidimensional theory of sovereignty. Unlike

did Madison revise his Notes more than previously

the federalists, the nationalists, and the hybrid camp,

thought, the documents were altered throughout the
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entirety of his life with an eye to his evolving vision
of republican government. One way to deal with
the unreliability of Madison’s Notes is to focus on
the reportedly more reliable Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787 by Farrand (1937). Studies
using this text are limited because they focus only
on the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Drawing
a distinction between original intent and original
understanding, second, suggests that these studies
focus exclusively on the topic of original intent which
can be understood as the “meaning the Framers—
the delegates who drafted the document in 1787—
intended the Constitution to have” (Maggs 2009, 461).
In contrast, original understanding can be understood
as “what the persons who participated in the state
ratifying conventions thought the Constitution
meant” (Maggs 2009, 461). As potential sources
for understanding the Constitution, James Madison
suggests that original understanding is preferable
to original intent. Speaking in the First Congress,
Madison argues:
[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for
the body of men who formed our Constitution,
the sense of that body could never be regarded
as the oracular guide in expounding the
Constitution. As the instrument came from them
it was nothing more than the draft of a plan,
nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity
236

were breathed into it by the voice of the people,
speaking through the State Conventions. If we
were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the
instrument beyond the face of the instrument,
we must look for it, not in the General
Convention, which proposed, but in the State
Conventions, which accepted and ratified the
Constitution (quoted in Maggs 2009, 458-59).
Following Madison’s recommendation, this project
tests for the presence of the theory of sovereignty
found by Mogg (2006) in the Massachusetts State
Ratifying Convention (1787-1788).
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. The next section provides an overview of the
Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention and discusses
the methodological approach used here in the analysis
of the convention. Next, the third section presents
the results for principle sovereignty and the fourth
section provides the results for derived sovereignty.
Here, Mogg’s conclusion of there being a single,
multidimensional understanding of sovereignty
across the Constitutional Convention of 1787 proves
consistent with the analysis of the Massachusetts
Ratifying Convention. Finally, this paper concludes
by considering the implications of the conclusions
presented here for how one should understand
sovereignty and the U.S. Constitution. Additionally,
the conclusion considers the implications of this study
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for how one should understand American political

ratification, “faced a far greater challenge than their

thinking more generally and how one should approach

counterparts in Pennsylvania, who had a solid majority

the study of American political thought.

from the start of their convention. Massachusetts was

The Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention and How
to Study It
While conventional wisdom identifies the New York

a whole new game.” Thus, in addition to persuading
fellow delegates via reasoned discourse, proponents
also had to rely on political machinations and identify

and Virginia Ratifying Conventions as the two keys

areas of compromise in an effort to turn opponents of

to ratification of the Constitution, Massachusetts

ratification into proponents.
Arguably the most important compromise

proves to be of critical importance as well. According
to Pauline Maier (2011, 155), “If Massachusetts
refused to ratify, other states—particularly New
Hampshire and New York—would probably follow
her example…if, however, Massachusetts ratified,
the Constitution would be well on its way toward
enactment.” The importance of Massachusetts for the
prospects of ratification takes on greater significance
when one considers the very real possibility that
Massachusetts would not ratify the Constitution.
With the divide between the delegates for and against
the Constitution roughly equal, ratification was not
a foregone conclusion as it was in Pennsylvania.
Aware of their precarious position, proponents of the
proposed Constitution had to work behind the scenes
to make allies and reach compromises in order to
ensure ratification. On this challenge, Maier (2011,
158) observes that the Massachusetts proponents of

of the Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention was
the introduction of amendments that would be
recommended for consideration after ratification
itself. In response to this suggestion, a number of
delegates who were previously opposed to ratification
changed their position and ultimately voted to ratify.
For these delegates, the proposed amendments
alleviated concerns that the grant of power to
the national government under the Constitution
threatened the security of the rights and liberties of
the people. Though many proponents did not think
that amendments were necessary, they embraced
the idea and worked on getting John Hancock on
board with the idea in order to ensure ratification.
Hancock, the president of the Convention, was a
necessary vote to the ratification process. Had he
not supported the ratification or amendments, it is
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possible that the Constitution would not have passed

them. A consequence of this approach is to relegate

in Massachusetts. Maier (2011, 194) writes: “…the

the delegates to a position of secondary importance

Federalists had to get Hancock on board…in a eulogy

behind ideas.

written after Hancock’s death, James Sullivan claimed

Another approach, one that recognizes the

that Hancock had reservations about the Constitution

importance of the delegates, emphasizes the role

and, before the state ratifying convention had even

played by political and commercial interests (see

assembled, drafted a set of amendments he planned

Jensen 1943; Onuf 1988; Morgan 1988; Wolfe 1977,

to propose.” As demonstrated below, Hancock is an

Roche 1966; Beard 1935). For these scholars, the

example of a delegate whose vote was swayed with

Constitution is best viewed as the means to securing

the introduction of amendments to the Constitution,

personal aggrandizement and not a consequence of

leading to the ultimate ratification of the Constitution

any overarching principles or ideas. At the state level,

in Massachusetts. A key to understanding Hancock’s

Van Beck Hall (1972) uses quantitative analysis to

change and the change of others is the distinction

demonstrate that Massachusetts politics between 1780

between principle and derived sovereignty identified

and 1791 are driven by socioeconomic influences.

by Mogg (2006) and tested here.
In looking at the Massachusetts ratifying

In particular, his analysis demonstrates that the split

convention, one is presented with two general

and its inland rural/agricultural regions explains

approaches, and both are limited. A standard way to

Massachusetts’ politics generally, and that ratification

approach the study of the Constitutional Convention

of the Constitution can be viewed as affirmation

is to focus on issues of contention (see Rakove

of the belief that the Constitution would advance

1987; Diamond 1992; McDonald 1985 & 2004;

the commercial interests of the state’s commercial

Powell 1987; Rossiter 1966; Wood 1998; Jilson

centers. The problem here is that this approach rejects

1981 & 1988). This means that scholars focus on the

the idea that ideas matter and only views political

understandings of ideas as proposed by the delegates.

actors as being motivated by self-interest. While such

These scholars study these ideas to have a more

an approach does explain a great deal of political

robust understanding of the delegate’s positions on

behavior, it does not explain all political behavior.

238

between Massachusetts’ coastal economic centers
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In particular, it does not explain political decisions of

Principle Sovereignty in the Massachusetts

monumental significance like ratification.
What is needed instead is an approach that

Ratifying Convention of 1788
Principle sovereignty refers to the authorization of

takes the individual delegates seriously as well as

government, where the principle sovereign authorizes

the importance of political ideas. Mogg does this by

the general government to hold certain powers and

examining each of the arguments and reasoning for

use them to secure the ends of government. The

or against all issues that arise at the Constitutional

principle decides what powers its agent is given and

Convention of 1787. While she considers all issues

determines the extent to which these powers may

that arise, Mogg looks specifically for insight into

be exercised. It is the responsibility of the agent,

their position on sovereignty. This study follows

who possesses derived sovereignty, to exercise these

the lead of Mogg and examines the delegates on

powers as instructed. Mogg’s (2006) analysis finds

all issues raised with special attention given to the

that principle sovereignty is operationalized in two

indicators of sovereignty identified by Mogg (2006,

ways at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. First,

7-12). For each delegate, I will take their respective

some delegates operationalize principle sovereignty

positions on sovereignty and create vignettes that

at the national level and locate it in the hands of the

bring together their statements over the course of

American people. Whereas another group of delegates

the entire convention. Using the vignettes, I will

are also committed to the idea of popular sovereignty,

classify the delegates based on (1) their positions

but this group operationalizes principle sovereignty at

on where principle sovereignty is located (people of

the state level and places it in the hands of the people

the United States, people of the particular states, or

of the separate thirteen states.

the state governments) and, (2) their view of derived
sovereignty (strong national government, strong
national government in need of greater checks, and
weak national government/strong state governments).
The results of this analysis are presented in the next
two sections of this paper.

The analysis in this section presents evidence
which supports Mogg’s (2006) conclusion that
principle sovereignty is operationalized in two,
distinct ways. Of the thirty-six classifiable delegates
in the Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention, a strong
majority (n=24) take the position that principle
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sovereignty resides with the American people across

For these delegates, the Constitution rejects the

all of the states without regard to state boundaries.

confederate structure of the Articles of Confederation

Under this theory, there is one principle sovereign—

and replaces it with a union form of government.

We the People of the United States. Three delegates

Where the Continental Congress was the creation of

believe that the Constitution is founded on the

thirteen sovereign states, the government created by

principle of popular sovereignty but locate principle

the Constitution would rest on the authority of the

sovereignty with the people acting separately within

American people acting as a whole. Delegates holding

each of the thirteen states. Under this theory, the

this position are located in the first column of

principle sovereign would be the people of the thirteen
states, who would vote on ideas and then have the

Table One.
An example of this understanding of principle

state governments present the results to the general

sovereignty is seen in a speech from Mr. T. Dawes of

government. The unique approach of this method

Boston. He says, “…as thirty thousand inhabitants

allows power to be derived mediately or immediately

will elect a representative, eight tenths of which

from the people. Unlike Mogg, this study identifies

electors perhaps are yeomen, and holders of farms, it

six delegates who hold the position that the state

will be their own faults if they are not represented by

governments possess principle sovereignty, meaning

such men as will never permit the land to be injured

that the state would inform all decisions about the

by unnecessary taxes” (Kaminski 2000,1289). Here,

general government, and the people would only have a

Dawes understands that it is the people who are

say in state matters. This third group of delegates hold

responsible for ensuring that they are represented in

the position that a confederation of states is preferable

the House of Representatives by the right people.

to the union proposed by the U.S. Constitution.1

Thus, the failure of elected officials to abstain from

Principle Sovereignty with the American People

the property of the people rests not with members

Delegates committed to popular sovereignty and
who locate principle sovereignty with the American
people as a whole can be viewed as strong nationalists.
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of Congress, but with the American people who
are responsible for holding their representatives
accountable. Dr. Jarvis develops the reasoning of Mr.
Dawes further when he argues “…that there is a very
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY | THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW 2020
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Table One: Delegate Positions on Principle Sovereignty at the
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention
People
(n= 27)

States
(n= 3)

Non-Classifiable
(n= 6)

Mr. Sedgwick

Mr. Widgery*

Dr. Taylor

Mr. Phillips

Dr. Jarvis

Capt. Dench*

Judge Dana

Mr. Davis

Mr. Dalton

Mr. Randall*

Mr. Nason

Mr. Bodman

Mr. Gorham

Mr. White

Mr. Parsons

Mr. Barrell

Mr. King

Mr. Singletary

Mr. Gore
Mr. Dawes
Mr. Bowdoin
His Ex. Hancock
Mr. Adams
Mr. Jones
Rev. Stillman
Mr. Heath
Capt. Snow
Judge Sumner
Rev. Thacher
Mr. Ames
Mr. Cabot
Mr. West
Mr. Turner
Gen. Brooks
Mr. Symmes
Mr. Choate
*Delegates with an asterisk operationalize principles sovereignty at the state level.
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material distinction in the two cases; for, however

this power. Under the union model, both the general

possible it may be that this controlling authority may

and state governments have the ability to act on the

be abused, it by no means followed that Congress,

individual. Another example of the preference for

in any situation, could strip the people of their right

union over confederacy is provided by Mr. Heath.

to a direct representation” (Kaminski 2000, 1220).

He says, “Everything depends on our union. I know

Dr. Jarvis articulates his understanding of principle

that some have supposed, that, although the union

sovereignty when he says that the people have a right

should be broken, particular states may retain their

to direct representation.

importance; but this cannot be. The strongest-nerved

This understanding of the people as the

state, even the right arm, if separated from the body,

principle sovereign is central to the understanding

must wither. If the great union be broken, our country,

that the government created by the Constitution is a

as a nation, perishes…” (Kaminski 2000, 1378). In

union and not a confederacy of states. In a union, the

this statement, Mr. Heath indicates that a union is

people are principle to the general government rather

necessary if America is going to continue as a country

than the state governments being principle, as is seen

going forward. Implicitly recalling the troubled history

in the confederate model. An example of rejecting

of confederacies, he indicates that the states must

the latter in favor of the former is seen when Mr.

give up the all principle sovereignty which they enjoy

Bowdoin says, “But the advantages of a union of the

under the Articles of Confederation. If they do not, he

states are not confined to mere safety from within or

fears that the nation will perish.

without. They extend not only to the welfare of each
state, but even to the interest of each individual of the
states” (Kaminski 2000, 1393). For Mr. Bowdoin, a

Principle Sovereignty with the People of the Thirteen
States

union is preferable to a confederacy because of the

Three delegates identified with an asterisk in Table

greater security it provides the nation, the individual

One are committed to popular sovereignty, but

states, and every person. Under a confederation, the

operationalize principle sovereignty at the state level.

general government is prevented from acting on the

In other words, whereas the nationalists operationalize

individual as generally, the state governments possess

principle sovereignty with the American people,

242
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these delegates operationalize principle sovereignty

the relationship between the people and the general

with the people of the states. For these three delegates,

(national) government, the state’s function is to serve

the relevant authorizing entity is the people of

as a middle-man where the people of the states elect

Massachusetts. This is consistent with the analysis

their representatives in the House (directly) and

of Mogg (2006).
This understanding of principle sovereignty

Senate (indirectly), with the state governments also
involved in the assignment of senators as the middle-

is evident, first, in Mr. Randall. He argues “Our

man between the people of the state and the general

manners, he said, were widely different from the

government. He continues:

Southern States; their elections were not so free and
unbiased; therefore, if the states were consolidated, he
thought it would introduce manners among us which
would set us at continual variance” (Kaminski 2000,
1303). Mr. Randall is concerned that the cultural
differences between the north and the south, because

Let us consider, sir, we are acting for the
people, and for ages unborn; let us deal fairly
and above board. Everyone comes here to
discharge his duty to his constituents, and I
hope none will be biased by the best orators;
because we are not acting for ourselves. I think
Congress ought to have power, such as is for
the good of the nation… (Kaminski 2000,
1244).

of slavery, prevent the possibility of a truly national

Randall views the responsibility of the delegates to the

culture which he deems a necessary requirement for

Massachusetts Convention as delegates of the people.

national, principle sovereignty to work. While he

Given the logic of the principle/agent relationship, this

remains a proponent of locating principle sovereignty

would make the people of Massachusetts the principle

with the people, Mr. Randall contends that the

sovereign. Mr. Randall is largely concerned with

people of the states would serve as a more effective

diversity. According to him, the diversity of the nation

principle because they would do a better job of

undermines the ability to form a national sentiment

protecting the rights of the people, given that public

of the will of the people. To this end, his analysis

opinion on certain matters varies by state. This also

of diversity indicates that the best way to aggregate

speaks to his understanding of a union structure

principle sovereignty is at the state level where there

of government as he refers to the consolidation of

is a high enough level of homogeneity to facilitate the

states, which is used in a union. In his formulation of

idea of the people.
243

Capt. Dench also falls into this camp with Mr.
Randall stating, “…it had been observed, and he was
not convinced that the observation was wrong, that the
grant of the powers in this section would produce a

where sovereignty lies, though there is no direct proof
of this understanding.
Principle Sovereignty with the State Governments

consolidation of the states, and the moment it begins,

To this point of the analysis, the results presented here

a dissolution of the state governments commences. If

for the Massachusetts ratifying convention confirm

mistaken, he wished to be set right” (Kaminski 2000,

the results of Mogg (2006) as principle sovereignty

1338). Dench thinks that the state governments are

has been located with the people, but the people has

necessary for proper government, but he is not exactly

been operationalized at both the national and state

clear on how this applies to the current Constitution.

levels. A third understanding of principle sovereignty

Dench rejects the idea of a consolidation of states,

is found in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention,

which would unify each of the thirteen states under

but not found in Mogg. Here, three delegates take

the general government, speaking to his understanding

the position that principle sovereignty resides with

that a complete diversion from the states would

the state governments. These delegates are identified

be wrong. To this end, he is looking for some

in the second column of Table One. As mentioned

reconciliation between the potential abuses between

in a previous footnote, Mogg is able to accumulate

both the union and confederacy, trying to find some

enough textual evidence to conclude that delegates to

structure in the middle that might remedy these issues.

the Constitutional Convention of 1787 who advocate

Initially, Dench is understood to identify the state

for a confederate form of government actually

governments as principle. This is arguably the result

operationalize principle sovereignty with the people of

of a misunderstanding in definition of sovereignty and

each individual state. In the absence of similar textual

application thereof. It could be argued that, although

evidence, this study cannot draw the same conclusion.

he is concerned with the state governments, this does

Thus, Dr. Taylor, Judge Dana, and Mr. Nason are

not mean that he views them as principle. Rather,

classified here as locating principle sovereignty with

he could simply understand that these bodies are

the state governments.

necessary for government to function regardless of
244
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Dr. Taylor says:
By the Articles of Confederation, annual
elections are provided for, though we have
additional securities in a right to recall any
or all of our members from Congress, and
a provision for rotation. In the proposed
Constitution, there is no provision for
rotation; we have no right by it to recall our
delegates. In answer to the observations, that,
by frequency of elections, good men will be
excluded, I answer, if they behave well, it is
probable they will be continued; but if they
behave ill, how shall we remedy the evil
(Kaminski 2000, 1185-1186)?

it, a consolidation of the states, he should
readily agree with that gentleman that the
representation of the people was much too
small; but this was a charge brought against it
without any foundation in truth. So far from
it, that it must be apparent to everyone, that
the federal government springs out of, and can
alone be brought into existence by, the state
governments. Demolish the latter, and there is
an end of the former (Kaminski 2000, 1238).
As Judge Dana understands it, there is no general
government whatsoever without state governments
retaining their full sovereign powers in a

Dr. Taylor prefers the model of government proposed

confederation. Here he identifies the state governments

by the Articles of Confederation. This is seen in his

as the principle sovereign to the general government

understanding of a requirement for annual elections

and identifies that the ends of government will come

in contrast to the Constitution’s call for biennial

with a union structure.

elections in the House. This preference indicates his

Mr. Nason was one of the few delegates to

commitment to a confederacy of states rather than the

explicitly speak to his understanding of the state

union structure which is outlined in the Constitution.

governments as principle. He says, “We are under

What he fails to account for is the ability to recall

oath: we have sworn that Massachusetts is a sovereign

delegates who are working against the will of the

and independent state. How, then, can we vote for

people through re-election.
Judge Dana is also in favor of a confederate

this Constitution, that destroys that sovereignty”

structure of government. Similar to Dr. Taylor, he is

the general government will undermine the states’

concerned with representation, but he thinks that the

power. He is a proponent of states as principle because

Constitution will fail should there be anything but a

he, and other delegates with the same understanding,

confederate structure. He says:

do not think that the American people, in any capacity,

…if the Constitution under consideration
was in fact what its opposers had often called

(Kaminski 2000, 1397)? Mr. Nason is concerned that

have the ability to maintain the ends of government,

245

but rather that with this shift in principle, the general

the ends of government, the Constitution does not

government will be destroyed.

adequately protect the rights and liberties of the

Derived Sovereignty in the Massachusetts’
Ratifying Convention of 1788

people. Thus, further safeguards are necessary. The
results for derived sovereignty are summarized in
Table Two.

Derived sovereignty refers to the powers of the
general government as authorized by the principle.
This dimension outlines the powers which the general
government holds as well as the extent of these
powers. This topic, as seen in the Massachusetts
Ratifying Convention, is widely contested and
debated. Following Mogg (2006), it is possible to
categorize delegates at state ratifying conventions as
either supporting strong or weak derived sovereignty.
The former are understood as those supporting a
strong grant of power by the Constitution to the
general government that is adequate for achieving the
ends of government. The latter are those maintaining
that the extent of derived sovereignty granted to
the general government by the Constitution is too
extensive and will ultimately undermine the ends of
government. Given that the Massachusetts Ratifying
Convention proposed amendments to the Constitution,
it is necessary to provide a third category for derived
sovereignty. This middle position holds that while the
grant of derived sovereignty is adequate to achieve

246
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Table Two: Delegate Positions on Derived Sovereignty at the
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention
Strong
(n= 22)
Mr. Sedgwick

Middle
(n= 5)
His Ex. John Hancock

Weak
(n= 8)
Mr. Widgery

Dr. Jarvis

Mr. Barrell

Dr. Taylor

Mr. Dalton

Mr. Turner

Capt. Dench

Mr. Gorham

Mr. Cabot

Mr. Randall

Mr. Parsons

Judge Dana

Mr. Bodman

Mr. King

Mr. White

Mr. Dawes

Mr. Nason

Mr. Bowdoin

Mr. Singletary

Non-Classifiable
(n= 1)
Mr. Davis

Mr. Phillips
Mr. Adams
Mr. Jones
Rev. Stillman
Mr. Heath
Mr. Gore
Judge Sumner
Rev. Thacher
Mr. Ames
Mr. Choate
Mr. Symmes
Gen. Brooks
Mr. West
Capt. Snow
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Strong

dignity, to vest the Congress with the powers
described in this section (Kaminski 2000,
1300).

Delegates who believe in a strong derived sovereign
are in favor of the general government holding

This is the main argument in favor of strong derived

more power. These delegates make up the majority

sovereignty: the general government needs to hold

of the delegates coded here (n=22). Based on the

enough power to protect the will of the people

results of the previous section, these delegates also

effectively. If it does not have the necessary grant of

understand that the American people are the principle

power, as Mr. Gore and other delegates understand,

sovereign. Of the twenty-two delegates classified as

the general government will fail. This is a huge

holding the strong derived sovereignty position, only

concern among delegates, and they all take different

Mr. Phillips does not view the American people as

views on how to best address the potential abuse of

principle sovereign, and this is because he cannot

power. General Brooks says, “…when that power is

be classified on this dimension of sovereignty. The

given, with proper checks, the danger is at an end.

strong understanding of derived sovereignty thinks

When men are answerable, and within the reach of

that it is necessary for the general government to

responsibility, they cannot forget that their political

have more power in order to better secure the ends

existence depends upon their good behavior”

of government. These delegates also have faith in the

(Kaminski 2000, 1255). Representatives to the general

capacity of the American people to check the derived

government will not abuse their power, according to

sovereignty exercised by elected officials. On the

Gen. Brooks, because the people who elected them

relationship between the people as principle sovereign

have the authority to remove them from office if

and derived sovereignty, Mr. Gore of Boston says:

they do.

Some gentlemen suppose it is unsafe and
unnecessary to vest the proposed government
with authority to "lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises. Let us strip the subject
of every thing that is foreign, and refrain from
likening it with governments, which, in their
nature and administration, have no affinity;
and we shall soon see that it is not only safe,
but indispensably necessary to our peace and
248

Weak
The eight delegates classified as holding the position
of weak derived sovereignty believe that the general
government should have little power (or few powers).
The delegates with an understanding of strong derived
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY | THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW 2020

sovereignty knew that the grant of power in the

power to tax may be employed to restrict or possibly

Constitution was extensive, but they thought it was

undermine totally the right to vote: “If Congress…

necessary to the ends of government, and they thought

have this power of taxing directly, it will be in their

that these powers were well-protected, so they were

power to enact a poll tax. Can gentlemen tell why they

okay with granting them to the general government.

will not attempt it, and by this method make the poor

These delegates view the grant of power to the general

pay as much as the rich” (Kaminski 2000, 1251). Mr.

government proposed by the Constitution as a threat to

Widgery foresees a future where America transforms

the rights and liberties of the American people, as well

from a democracy into an aristocracy. This would

as understanding that the derived sovereignty written

remove the distinction between the United States and

into the Constitution was not sufficiently checked, so

England and effectively undermine the American

they worried about the general government abusing

Revolution and its legacy.

their power. Mr. Nason illustrates this belief in his

Middle

praise of liberty. He says, “I beg the indulgence of
this honorable body to permit me to make a short
apostrophe to Liberty. O Liberty! thou greatest good!
thou fairest property! with thee I wish to live — with
thee I wish to die! Pardon me if I drop a tear on the
peril to which she is exposed; I cannot, sir, see this
brightest of jewels tarnished…” (Kaminski 2000,
1397). Mr. Nason fears the loss of liberty will be a
direct consequence of ratification. In the name of
protecting liberty, Mr. Nason favors limiting the
general government more than is provided by the
Constitution. Similarly, Mr. Widgery worries that
the power of taxation may be used to undermine the
democratic foundation of America. He warns that the

To this point, the results of the Massachusetts
Ratifying Convention support the conclusions
of Mogg (2006). The fact that amendments were
recommended by the Massachusetts Ratifying
Convention suggests a third understanding of derived
sovereignty but does not undermine her initial
conclusions. Accordingly, the five delegates who fall
into this middle category view the grant of power to
the general government as necessary to the function of
the general government. However, they also believe
that the Constitution does not adequately safeguard
the rights and liberties of the American people. In
an effort to win these delegates over and ensure
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ratification, amendments were proposed as an addition

protections from the general government which were

to the Constitution. On the need for amendments and
greater security, Mr. Turner says, “…for by small

not highlighted in the Constitution as it stood.
The introduction of amendments to the

degrees has liberty, in all nations, been wrested from

Constitution swayed the votes of many delegates

the hands of the people. I know great powers are

who were stuck in the middle in terms of derived

necessary to be given to Congress, but I wish they may sovereignty. John Hancock, President of the
be well guarded” (Kaminski 2000, 1226). Mr. Turner

Convention says, “…if amended (as I feel assured

understands that there is a necessity for extensive

it will be) according to your proposals, it cannot

derived power to protect the people, but he does not

fail to give the people of the United States a greater

think that there are proper checks on this power. Mr.

degree of political freedom, and eventually as much

Barrell adds the following:

national dignity, as falls to the lot of any nation on

Congress will be vested with more extensive
powers than ever Great Britain exercised over
us; too great, in my opinion, to entrust with
any class of men…while we consider them as
men of like passions, the same spontaneous,
inherent thirst for power with ourselves,
great and good as they may be, when they
enter upon this all-important charge, what
security can we have that they will continue so
(Kaminski 2000, 1448)?
Mr. Barrell is concerned that the general government
will abuse their power should they be awarded too
much of it. He is worried that this could undermine the
liberties of the people, but also that they simply cannot
be trusted with such a broad authorization of power.
In his understanding, political figures will inevitably
abuse the power they were given as a result of
holding the position. This shows his need for further
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earth” (Kaminski 2000, 1475). Hancock was on the
fence about the Constitution before amendments
were added. This act swayed his vote in favor of the
Constitution, and since he was the president of the
convention, it is possible that many other delegates
followed suit. Had amendments not been added to the
Constitution, it is likely that the Constitution would
not have been ratified in the state of Massachusetts.
Mr. Randall also falls into this camp, saying, “…I
think it becomes us, as wise men, as the faithful
guardians of the people's rights, and as we wish well to
posterity, to propose such amendments as will secure
to us and ours that liberty without which life is a
burden” (Kaminski 2000, 1449). Initially, Randall was
against the Constitution as he felt it provided too much
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY | THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW 2020

derived power to the general government. However,

governments. While Mogg is able to show that

with the introduction of amendments, he became more

delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787

comfortable with the further protections of individual

ultimately believe that the people of the states are

rights and freedoms of the people. With this addition,

the principle sovereign, there is no evidence that

he is willing to vote in favor of the ratification

allows the delegates to the Massachusetts Convention

of the Constitution.

advocating for confederacy to be classified similarly.
Additionally, analysis of the Massachusetts Ratifying

Conclusion
The results of my research confirm those found in

Convention suggest that derived sovereignty can be

Mogg. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787,

by Mogg. For some delegates, the grant of power

evidence points to the presence of a multidimensional

to the general government is adequate, but the

understanding of sovereignty. The first dimension,

safeguards protecting the rights and liberties of the

principle sovereignty, focuses on the question of

American people are inadequate. Thus, amendments

who authorizes the existence of government. Mogg

are recommended by the Massachusetts Ratifying

finds that there are two formulations of principle

Convention, which has the effect of securing

sovereignty at the Convention of 1787, with the first
locating principle sovereignty in the American people

Massachusetts’ vote for ratification.
While these conclusions both confirm and

and the second locating it with the people of the states.

extend Mogg’s analysis, one should view the results

The second dimension, derived sovereignty, focuses

presented here with caution for two reasons. First,

on the extent of the powers authorized by the principle

the analysis presented here is based on a very small

sovereign. Here, the focus is on the nature of the grant

sample size of thirty-six classifiable delegates. 355

of power provided to the general government by the

delegates were in attendance at the MA convention.

Constitution.
Unlike Mogg, evidence from the

Of those 355, 66 spoke. Of those 66, 36 were

Massachusetts Ratifying Convention suggests the

thirty-six delegates focused on here are representative

presence of another principle sovereign, the state

of Massachusetts more generally. Second, the

viewed beyond the strong/weak distinction employed

classifiable. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the
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Massachusetts’ Convention is limited in focus. There

reasonable to conclude that this level of precision is

is hardly any discussion of the executive branch, the

beyond the capabilities of the people and their elected

judicial branch, and many other relevant aspects

and unelected officials. Of all of the issues considered

of the Constitution.
When combined with the analysis and

by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention

argument of Mogg, the results presented here have
implications for how one should consider the issue
of sovereignty in American politics. In particular, the
multidimensionality of sovereignty highlights the
need for clarity. This need for clarity speaks directly
to James Madison’s concern with the problem of
language. In Federalist #37, Madison warns his reader

of 1787, Madison highlights, “…the arduous…
task of marking the proper line of partition, between
the authority of the general, and that of the state
governments” (#37: 182). For Madison, it is the topic
of sovereignty where the language available to the
delegates proves most insufficient. Scholars working
on this topic should give Madison’s warning the
attention it deserves.

about the problems inherent in language. He writes,
“…The obscurity arising from the complexity of

Finally, this study speaks to how scholars

objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties,

should approach the study of American political

the medium through which the conceptions of men are

thought. Students of American political thought should

conveyed to each other, adds a fresh embarrassment”

not only pay greater attention to the state ratifying

(#37: 183). Here, Madison suggests that the

conventions, but they should be mindful of the fact

imperfection of language has the effect of rendering

that these conventions will not simply confirm or

complex ideas and concepts more obscure. He writes,

reject previously articulated understandings of key

“The faculties of the mind itself have never yet been

terms. While this study set out to confirm or reject

distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision,

the understanding of sovereignty identified by Mogg

by all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical

(2006), it was able to add to her understanding of

philosophers” (#37: 182). Thus, if the requisite

sovereignty. This indicates that the meaning of key

precision lies beyond the capacities of the “most

aspects of American political thought are likely

acute and metaphysical philosophers” (#37: 182), it is

never set in stone. Rather, they are continually being
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reconsidered, revised, and added to by the various
actors of the American political system.
Notes
1.

It may be the case that the six delegates
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classified here as advocating for the state governments
possessing principle sovereignty may actually hold the
position that the people of each state possess principle
sovereignty. This is what Mogg finds in her analysis.
Ultimately, the lack of any textual evidence suggesting
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Ratifying Convention precluded me from classifying
these delegates as locating principle sovereignty in the
hands of the people of the thirteen states, and rather
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